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Abstract—This paper presents an approach to blending a de-
identified face region with its original background, for the purpose 
of completing the process of face de-identification. The re-
identification risk of the de-identified FERET face images has 
been evaluated for the k-Diff-furthest face de-identification 
method, using several face recognition benchmark methods 
including PCA, LBP, HOG and LPQ. The experimental results 
show that the k-Diff-furthest face de-identification delivers high 
privacy protection within the face region while blending the de-
identified face region with its original background may 
significantly increases the re-identification risk, indicating that de-
identification must also be applied to image areas beyond the face 
region. 
Keywords—face de-identification; privacy protection; face re-
identification; seamless cloning 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the advance of sensor technology and the reduced cost 
of data storage, a huge amount of personal data are being 
collected at an increasing pace due to their economic and social 
values. Face biometric, one of the easiest biometrics to collect, 
is widely used in various application scenarios. Its popularity has 
boosted due to the recent breakthrough in pattern recognition 
using deep learning. The latest benchmark results on the LFW 
(Labelled Faces in the Wild) dataset showed that with a massive 
training set the performance of face recognition based on a deep 
convolutional neural network (CNN) successfully achieved a 
pair-wise verification accuracy of 99.77% [1]. Zhang et al. [2] 
showed that the person recognition rate could achieve 83.05% 
on a photo album, where only half of the images in the album 
contain a frontal face. 
However, such data often contain sensitive personal 
information, which has inevitably raised privacy concerns and 
been exploited in privacy attacks. The 1995 Data Protection 
Directive of the European Union (Directive 95/46/EC) [3] 
demands the deployment of appropriate technical and 
organizational measures to protect private information in the 
course of transferring or processing such data. This legal 
requirement along with ethical responsibilities has attracted 
intensive research effort in the field of de-identification [4], [5]. 
The goal of de-identification is twofold: privacy protection as 
well as data utility preservation. In such way, a de-identified 
dataset can be used as a replacement of its original dataset to 
facilitate further data analysis. 
Masking, blurring and pixilation are the ad hoc face de-
identification methods that were widely used in the past. 
However these methods do not achieve their goal of privacy 
protection as the blurring process is revisable while the identity 
in a pixelated or masked face image can be 100% recognised by 
parrot recognition [4]. Furthermore, all of these ad hoc methods 
are destructive and destroy data utility. 
The k-Same-Pixel/Eigen face de-identification method was 
the first successful face de-identification method in terms of 
privacy protection. The k-Same methods guarantee a re-
identification risk lower than 1/k. However, the original k-Same-
Pixel/Eigen method has some limitations, including ghost 
artefacts in the de-identified image, k-dependant performance, 
loss of data utility and loss of data diversity, etc. Some of these 
limitations have been successfully addressed. For example, k-
Same-M [5] face de-identification eliminated ghost artefacts by 
aligning faces in the Active Appearance Models. To further 
improve the privacy protection performance, k-Same-furthest 
[6] and k-Diff-furthest [7] face de-identification methods were 
proposed by the authors and their privacy protection 
performance with some moderate datasets were presented. This 
paper presents the work that has been carried out to close the 
loop of face de-identification, where the de-identified face 
region is blended back with the background of the original face 
image. Furthermore, the privacy protection performance of the 
previously proposed  k-Diff-furthest methods has been evaluated 
with the benchmark dataset FERET, before and after 
background blending. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 
explains the main techniques used in this work. Section III 
describes our work on closing the loop of face de-identification. 
Section IV evaluates the privacy protection performance of the 
proposed face de-identification methods. Finally, Section V 
summarises the key findings and proposes future work. 
II. SUBJECT REVIEW 
A. Face Modelling 
Active Appearance Model (AAM) is a statistical approach to 
object modelling. In AAMs, each face image region is 
represented as a combination of a face shape model and a face 
texture model. The face shape is defined by the locations of a set 
of pre-defined facial landmarks and the shapeless texture is 
generated by warping the original face onto a common shape. 
An AAM is established through training, where Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) is applied to both the shapes and the 
textures of the faces in the training set for the purpose of 
dimensionality reduction. As a result, only the first 𝑛 shape PCA 
eigenvectors {𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛} and the first 𝑚 texture PCA 
eigenvectors {𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑚} are used by the trained AAM to 
represent a given face image. For a given face image, the trained 
AAM generates its shape as 𝑠 = 𝑠0 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , and its texture 
as 𝐴 = 𝐴0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝐴𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 , where 𝑠0 and 𝐴0 are respectively the 
average shape and texture over the training set, shape parameters 
𝐩 ∈  ℝ𝑛 and texture parameters 𝛌 ∈ ℝ𝑚. Typically, when shape 
and texture parameters are combined together, a scaling factors 
is applied to one of the two parameter sets, e.g. in the format of 
{𝑊𝑠𝑝1 , … , 𝑊𝑠𝑝𝑛 , 𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝑚} , to make sure they share a common 
range. AAMs have been used in face de-identification to not 
only extra shape and texture features from given face images but 
also to synthesise new face images. Some face features are not 
identity related and but will affect the visual quality of the de-
identified images in forms of ghost artefacts (e.g. glasses, beard 
and moustache) or unnatural skin tone (e.g. illumination 
condition). To make sure good visual quality of the de-identified 
face images, some non-identity related factors are removed in 
this work by excluding face images with such non-identity 
features from the AAM training set. More details of this is given 
in Section III with example result images. 
B. The k-Diff-furthest Face De-identification Method 
The k-Same methods (k-Same-Pixel, k-Same-M, k-Same-
furthest, etc.) all performs face de-identification by applying 
microaggregation to the original face images, where the set of 
original faces are divided into clusters of k and, for each cluster 
formed, all the original faces in the cluster are de-identified with 
the average of that cluster. As each de-identified face image 
appears in the de-identified image set k times and it can be 
matched, at best, with one of its k original faces, all k-Same 
method can guarantee a re-identification risk lower than 1/k for 
their de-identified faces. 
To further reduce the re-identification risk, the k-Same-
furthest method was proposed. It minimises the association 
between subjects and their face data by introducing data 
swapping after microaggragation. In each iteration of de-
identification, k-Same-furthest forms two clusters, each of size 
k, among the remaining original faces and ensures the distance 
of the two formed clusters is maximised. Unlike k-Same-Pixel 
and k-Same-M, the k-Same-furthest method de-identifies the 
faces in one cluster using the average of the other cluster rather 
than its own. A similar clustering approach has been adopted in 
the MDAV-generic to form clusters of size k [8]. As stated in 
[8], optimal clustering is NP-hard. The clustering approach of 
[8] as well as the k-Same-furthest method is near-optimal. The 
main differences between the k-Same-furthest and the MDAV-
generic method are: 1) MDAV-generic always uses the average 
of the remaining data to form the next pair of clusters while k-
Same-furthest forms the next cluster pair based on a randomly 
selected face. As a result, any two runs of the k-Same-further 
method could hardly produce identical results. 2) Overlapping 
between each pair of clusters is prevented in k-Same-furthest to 
minimise re-identification risk (mathematical proof of this has 
been given in [7]). And 3) k-Same-furthest applies data 
swapping between each pair of clusters while MDAV-generic as 
a microaggregation method, it does not adopt data swapping. 
In a set of k-Same de-identified face images, there are at least 
𝑘 subjects sharing the same de-identified face, making it 
impossible to distinguish let alone track individuals. In 
information theory, entropy of a data set is defined as the 
negative of the logarithm of its probability distribution. 
Repetition of data in k-Same face de-identification inevitably 
leads to entropy loss or information loss. Let 𝐅orig =
 {Γ1, … , Γ𝑀} be a set of 𝑀 face images and be person-specific 
(i.e. one image per person). Let 𝐅𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑑  denote the de-identified 
version of 𝐅𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔. The entropy of 𝐅𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔 and  𝐅𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑑  is given in (1) 
and (2), respectively.  
 𝐻(𝐅orig) = − ∑ P(Γ𝑖) log2 P(Γ𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1 = − log2
1
𝑀
 (1) 
 𝐻(𝐅𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑑) = − ∑ 𝑃(Γ𝑑𝑖) log2 𝑃(Γ𝑑𝑖) ≤ − log2
𝑘
𝑀
⌊
𝑀
𝑘
⌋
𝑖=1
  
                        = − log2
1
𝑀
− log2 𝑘 = 𝐻(𝐅𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔) − log2 𝑘  (2) 
It is easy to see that 𝐻(𝐅𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔) > 𝐻(𝐅𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑑) as 𝑘 > 1, 
meaning that information has been lost through the 
microaggreation process in k-Same face de-identification. This 
information loss is due to a decrease in data diversity but it is the 
mechanism adopted in all k-Same face de-identification methods 
for achieving a guaranteed re-identification risk lower than 1/𝑘. 
To prevent information loss, we have maintained data 
diversity in the de-identified face set and proposed the k-Diff-
furthest face de-identification method [7]. Like the k-Same-
furthest method, k-Diff-furthest forms two non-overlapping 
clusters in each iteration. However, it swaps the cluster centres 
without aggregating the faces in each cluster. There are two 
contributions of k-Diff-furthest. Firstly, the entropy of the de-
identified dataset is the same as that of the original dataset, 
which means each subject gets a unique de-identified face. The 
privacy protection performance of the proposed k-Diff-furthest 
method is evaluated in Section IV where the re-identification 
risk of the k-Diff-furthest de-identified faces is always near-zero. 
C. Re-identification Risk of the De-identified Faces 
Three types of re-identification attack can be used to test the 
protection performance of the de-identification results [4]. The 
first type of attack is termed naïve recognition, in which the 
original face images are used as the gallery and de-identified 
face images as the probes. The second type of attack is termed 
reverse recognition, in which the de-identified face images are 
used as the gallery and the original face images as the probes. 
The third type of attack is termed parrot recognition. The word 
‘parrot’ means that the de-identification technique is duplicated 
by the attacker and the set of de-identified face images generated 
by the attacker is used as probes to match with the published 
version of the de-identified face image set. As mentioned in 
Section II.B, in each iteration of k-Same/Diff-furthest face de-
identification two clusters are formed based on a randomly 
selected face. This means it is highly unlikely to repeat the same 
random selections and produce the same set of de-identified 
faces. In other words, parrot recognition does not work on either 
k-Same-furthest or k-Diff-furthest method. 
TABLE I.  KEY PARAMETERS OF THE FACE RECOGNITION METHODS 
USED IN THE EVELUATION EXPERIMENTS 
Feature Parameter values Distance measurement 
PCA – Euclidean distance 
LBP 
radius = 1, 
neighbours = 8 
Chi-squared distance 
HOG 
cell = 10 × 10, 
orientations = 16 
Cosine distance 
LPQ cell = 10 × 10 Cosine distance 
 
In our work, AAM is used as the face descriptor. The 
proposed face de-identification methods form clusters based on 
Euclidean distance in the AAM feature space. Experimental 
results from our previous work [6], [9] showed that the re-
identification risk is near zero if the attacker uses AAM face 
representation and matches faces based on Euclidean distance as 
well. To fully evaluate the privacy protection performance of our 
proposed methods, further evaluation experiments have been 
conducted which used various face representation models and  
distance measures, including Eigenface (PCA) [10], Local 
Binary Patterns (LBPs) [11], Histogram of Oriented Gradient 
(HOG) [12] and Local Phase Quantization (LPQ) features [13]. 
TABLE I summarises the key parameters of these face 
recognition benchmark methods. In addition, k-Nearest 
Neighbours method has been used to find the top match; and the 
dimension of both HOG features and LPQ features were reduced 
to 500 by applying PCA. 
III. BLENDING THE DE-IDENTIFIED FACE WITH ITS ORIGINAL 
IMAGE BACKGROUND 
So far, all the published face de-identification methods focus 
on the isolated face region in the original images. The result 
images presented in the publications are composed of a de-
identified face region and a blank background. The second 
column of Fig. 1 show the examples. As shown in the examples, 
the face region exclude hair, the ears, the forehead, the neck, the 
rest of the human body and the shooting environment. However, 
real life applications always prefer a face with a background. As 
stated, the background here means the rest of the human body 
and the shooting environment that are presented in the original 
image. In the case of face de-identification, this leads to the 
demand of blending the de-identified face region back onto its 
original image background. 
One of the main challenges in this task is given by the 
noticeable differences between the original and the de-identified 
faces in terms of skin tone, illumination, direction of lighting, 
etc. Previous research in the field of face swapping and image 
editing has investigated similar problems and has provided 
several useful solutions to this challenge. The study on face 
swapping in [14] used one recolouring method followed by one 
relighting method to adjust the skin tone. Impett et al. [15] used 
histogram matching in the RGB space to allow real-time 
operation. As real-time operation is not a priority for our work 
at this stage, the more powerful but more time-consuming 
method of Poisson seamless cloning [16] has been used to 
achieve a better visual quality of the blended images. 
As shown in Fig. 1, the face de-identification process 
changes not only the texture of a face but also the shape of the 
face. As a result, the shape of the new face might not fit within 
the original image background or the new shape may be too 
small to cover the area of the original face completely. This 
means a simple replacement would not generate satisfying 
results. One approach to this challenge could be warping the new 
face texture to the original face shape, where the shape of the 
original face would be recovered in the de-identified image and 
hence the face would fit perfectly with the original image 
background. However, the shape of a face contains rich personal 
identifiable information [17]. Bringing back the original face 
shape would significantly degrade the privacy protection 
performance of a face de-identification system. Therefore, the 
new shape of the de-identified face must be maintained after 
being blended with the original background.  
To maintain the new shape of the de-identified face region, 
a different approach has been taken in this work, where the 
background of the original face image is deformed to make just 
enough room to fit the new shape of the face region. The 
deformation of the background is achieved using Moving Least 
Squares [18] by solving the best affine transformation 𝑙𝑣(𝑥) that 
minimizes ∑ 𝑤𝑖|𝑙𝑣(𝑝𝑖) − 𝑞𝑖|
2
𝑖  where {𝑝𝑖} is a set of original 
points and {𝑞𝑖} is the target deformed positions of  {𝑝𝑖}. In our 
work, {𝑝𝑖} and {𝑞𝑖} each are the set of facial contour landmarks 
as defined in [19]. {𝑝𝑖} are the contour landmarks of the original 
face in the original image. {𝑞𝑖} are the aligned landmark 
positions of the de-identified face region. In this work, the de-
identified face region is aligned to the original face region using 
inner corners of the eyes and tip of the nose. 
The employment of background deformation has two 
contributions to a face de-identification system. The first 
contribution is a better visual quality of the de-identified face 
image. Fig. 1 shows the blending results of two de-identified 
faces without and with background deformation. As shown in 
the second image of Fig. 1 (c), unexpected white spots has 
appeared on the sides of the face as this de-identified face is 
wider than its original face. In Poisson blending, the new colours 
(or the new skin tone) of the de-identified face is calculated pixel 
by pixel based on the colours of the neighbourhood pixels in the 
destination image (i.e. the original face image in our case). When 
the de-identified face region is more narrow than its original face 
region (as in the first row of Fig. 1), for the pixels on either side 
of the de-identified face, their neighbourhood pixels from the 
destination (original) image are pixels within the original face 
region carrying the original skin tone. Therefore, after Poisson 
blending, the side of the de-identified face would be colour-
matched to the skin tone of the original face and hence the rest 
of the body (e.g. the ears, the forehead and the neck). The same 
applies to the inner pixels of the de-identified face (e.g. the 
redness on the cheeks). In contrast, when a de-identified face is 
wider than its original face (as in the second row of Fig. 1), for 
the pixels on either side of the de-identified face, their 
neighbourhood pixels from the destination (original) image are 
pixels outside the original face region carrying colours from the 
original background. As the original face has a white 
background, without background deformation white spots has 
appeared on both sides of the de-identified face after Poisson 
blending (as shown in the second image of Fig. 1 (c)). 
Fig. 1. Blending results of de-identified face regions. (a) Original face images. 
(b) De-identified face region. (c) De-identified face image without 
background deformation. (d) De-identified face image with background 
deformation. Without background deformation, original face shape of (a) 
is restored in (c); while the shape of (b) is kept in (d) through background 
deformation.  
 
Original Reconstructed Original Reconstructed 
    
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2. Examples of reconstructed faces from face features 
IV. EVALUATION OF RE-IDENTIFICATION RISK 
This section evaluates the re-identification risk of the de-
identified face images generated by the k-Diff-furthest method.  
A. Dataset 
A subset of the FERET face dataset [20] containing 963 
subjects has been used in the experiments. This subset was 
chosen from the available images of 994 subjects to ensure that 
each subject has two colour frontal face images (‘fa’ and ‘fb’). 
All the ‘fa’ faces were used as the gallery in the re-identification 
tests to match against either the original version or the de-
identified version of the ‘fb’ faces. Fig. 5 shows the original ‘fa’ 
(the first row), the original ‘fb’ (the second row) and the de-
identified ‘fb’ (the last row) images for five subjects from the 
chosen FERET subset. As each pair of ‘fa’ and ‘fb’ images were 
taken at the same shooting session, they present a high degree of 
similarity and hence a challenge to our k-Diff-furthest face de-
identification method. 
B. Training of the AAM Face Representation Model 
In this study, all the k-Diff-furthest de-identified faces were 
generated with the same AAM, which was trained on a subset of 
the FERET dataset. The AAM training set contains 1952 colour 
images of frontal faces taken from the FERET dataset and all of 
them are without glasses, beard or moustache. The exclusion of 
such features has enabled the automatic removal of such non-
identity related features through AAM representation, as shown 
by the examples in Fig. 2. As a result, no faded (or averaged out) 
glasses frame, beard or moustache would appear on the resulting 
de-identified face images to degrade the visual quality of the 
image. In addition, it was observed that the most significant 
texture feature in our trained AAM describes merely the lighting 
condition of the images. To calibrate the lighting condition, the 
most significant texture feature is always set to its mean value 
(over the training set) for all the images represented in our face 
model.  
C. Re-identification Tests 
Before calculating face features with its face representation 
model, all face recognition systems isolate the face region from 
the background through cropping. Some systems crop the face 
region with a rectangular box while some systems define the 
face region with some facial landmarks (e.g. those on the 
eyebrows and the jawline as in our k-Diff-furthest method). In 
our re-identification tests, the face images were first aligned to 
the mean shape of the training set (approximately 200 × 200 
pixels) and then cropped by a rectangular box co-centred with 
the mean shape. The size of the cropping box is either 200 × 200 
or 300 × 300 pixels. The cropped images can be with or without 
a background. Fig. 3 shows the face images used in these re-
identification tests for an example subject. 
TABLE III presents the re-identification risk of the k-Diff-
furthest method measured in naïve recognition attacks against 
four face recognition methods. All the recognition rates in 
TABLE III are averages over 10 runs and are presented in the 
format of accuracy ± standard deviation. TABLE III (a) shows 
that without merging with the original background the de-
identified face regions generated by our k-diff-furthest method 
always present a near zero re-identification risk for all the 
benchmark face recognition methods tested. 
TABLAE III (b) shows the re-identification risk increases 
when the de-identified face region is blended with its original 
background. This is mainly due to the fact that the Passion 
blending process has brought the skin-tone and illumination of 
the original face image back to the de-identified face image. 
Furthermore, the more the original background in a cropped face 
image, the higher the re-identification risk will be. The results 
are under 7% and still acceptable when the face images were 
cropped with a 200 × 200 square. However, the level of re-
identification risk became unacceptably high when the face 
images were cropped with a 300 × 300 square, indicating that 
background areas around the face region may also contain 
personal identifiable information and de-identification must also 
be applied to these image areas to achieve complete privacy 
protection. Further experiments have been conducted to evaluate 
the re-identification risk presented by the background area alone. 
Results of these experiments are presented and discussed in the 
next sub-section. 
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Fig. 3. Example of faces of one person with 200 pixels square (inside yellow 
boxes) and 300 pixels square cropping 
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TABLE IV shows the results of reverse recognition attacks, 
which are similar to those of naïve recognition attacks. All the 
de-identified face images yield a near zero re-identification risk 
when the background is excluded from the image but a much 
higher risk when the background is included. 
D. Background Attack to Face De-identification System 
As shown by TABLE III and TABLE IV the background 
area of an original face image presents personal identifiable 
information and can increase the re-identification risk when 
being blended with the de-identified face region. Here the 
background area may contain not only the background 
environment of the original image but also the hairstyle, the ear, 
the neck and the dressing style presented in the original image. 
This experiment aimed to investigate the possibility of using 
merely the background area of the original face image to attack 
the face de-identification system. Fig. 4 shows some example 
images used in this experiment. Background attack is a generic 
attack to any face de-identification method that modifies the face 
region only. The idea and implementation of this attack is basic. 
All the face images were applied with an inverse crop based on 
their facial landmarks, so that only the image area outside the 
face region was kept. Inverse crop has been used in face 
recognition to compare the recognition performance between 
human and computer [21], [22]. After inverse crop, the images 
were cropped into the size of 300 × 300 for face recognition. The 
experimental results are shown in TABLE II Comparing with 
the results shown in TABLE III, it is clear that the background 
area of the original image was the main contributor to the 
increase in the re-identification risk.  
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Fig. 4. Examples of inverse crop face images used in background attack 
experiment 
TABLE II.  RE-IDENTIFICATION RISK (%) OF INVERSE CROPPED FACE 
IMAGES 
Method 
300 × 300 inverse crop 
Original De-id 
PCA 56.39 31.82 ± 0.89 
LBP 78.19 55.62 ± 0.68 
HOG 53.27 27.07 ± 1.09 
LPQ 60.44 32.88 ± 1.06 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The experiment results show that the k-Diff-furthest face de-
identification method provides high privacy protection within 
the face region. However, blending the de-identified face to its 
original background increases the re-identification risk. 
Although a face recognition software focuses on the cropped 
face region, but information contained in the background area 
around the face region (e.g. hair colour, hairstyle, and dressing 
style) can also be used to identify a person. Our experiment of a 
background attack confirmed that face region is sufficient but 
not necessary for identifying a person. To protect privacy of the 
individuals captured in an image/video, de-identification must 
be applied to not only the face region but also all the image 
regions that contain personal identifiable information.  
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TABLE III.  NAIVE RECOGNITION RATES (%) OF ORIGINAL 'FB' FACES AND DE-IDENTIFIED 'FB' FACES AGAINST ORIGINAL ‘FA’ 
Method 
Without background With background 
200 × 200 300 × 300 200 × 200 300 × 300 
Original De-id Original De-id Original De-id Original De-id 
PCA 47.25 0.13 ± 0.16 42.37 0.07 ± 0.09 54.83 4.10 ± 0.58 61.27 39.13 ± 0.55 
LBP 74.25 0.11 ± 0.10 63.03 0.13 ± 0.11 83.39 1.30 ± 0.24 87.23 55.12 ± 0.56 
HOG 47.14 0.21 ± 0.14 18.38 0.17 ± 0.20 74.87 6.09 ± 0.48 78.09 56.93 ± 0.70 
LPQ 53.27 0.25 ± 0.18 47.04 0.25 ± 0.11 80.48 4.42 ± 0.61 82.66 59.14 ± 0.81 
 (a) (b) 
 
TABLE IV.  REVERSE RECOGNITION RATES (%) OF ORIGINAL ‘FB’ FACES AND DE-IDENTIFIED ‘FB’ FACES AGAINST ORIGINAL ‘FA’ 
Method 
Without background With background 
200 × 200 300 × 300 200 × 200 300 × 300 
Original De-id Original De-id Original De-id Original De-id 
PCA 45.38 0.33 ± 0.19 41.53 0.30 ± 0.21 53.48 9.41 ± 0.53 61.37 49.06 ± 0.61 
LBP 72.59 0.23 ± 0.14 63.14 0.21 ± 0.11 80.48 1.59 ± 0.41 86.60 59.28 ± 1.63 
HOG 46.52 0.24 ± 0.16 17.03 0.07 ± 0.09 74.77 5.92 ± 0.70 76.95 59.81 ± 0.68 
LPQ 50.88 0.23 ± 0.15 46.31 0.20 ± 0.14 80.06 4.35 ± 0.58 82.87 58.36 ± 0.48 
 (a) (b) 
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Fig. 5. Examples of the FERET face images used in the re-identification tests
 
